Abstract: The recognition of the seriousness and transboundary impacts of environmental crime has led to the adoption of specific legislative initiatives to combat environmental crime at both the international and European level. Yet although the EU member states have adopted successfully in 2008 a legal framework for harmonisation of environmental criminal law, the 1998 Council of Europe environmental crime convention has so far not entered into force, even more than fifteen years since its adoption. This paper examines the legal implications in a scenario in which a EU member state becomes bound by both the Council of Europe and the EU environmental crime instruments. In particular, it examines the extent to which the Council of Europe instrument could affect the EU common rules or alter their scope, thus hindering the external powers of the EU member states to ratify and negotiate independently the Council of Europe convention. This paper also discusses the extent to which the legality of the EU environmental crime directive may be effectively challenged in light of multilateral environmental agreements.
INTRODUCTION
This paper aims to examine the external dimensions of EU environmental crime legislation. In particular, it discusses the relationship between the EU directive on environmental criminal law adopted in October 2008 1 and the 1998 Council of Europe convention on environmental criminal law 2 from the perspective of the EU external relations; as well as the extent to which the legality of EU environmental crime legislation may be challenged for incompatibility with international environmental agreements. Although both the EU and Council of Europe environmental crime instruments have been the subject of academic analysis and debate in their own right, there has been little academic analysis of the legal relationship between the two instruments, particularly from the perspective of the EU external relations. In this context, the relationship between EU environmental crime legislation and international environmental agreements will also be examined. This paper will initially assess whether the EU member states remain competent to adopt and negotiate the 1998 Council of Europe environmental crime convention following the adoption of the EU environmental crime directive in October 2008. Secondly, this paper assesses the extent to which specific provisions of the Council of Europe environmental crime convention are compatible with the * Senior Lecturer in Law, Cardiff University, Law & Politics School, United Kingdom. Email: PereiraR1@cardiff.ac.uk This paper was presented in the AEPDIRI conference on 'The Extra-territorial Application of EU Law' that took place in Vigo, Spain, in June 2015. I would like to thank Professor Montserrat Abad Castelos and the two anonymous referees for their helpful comments to earlier drafts of this paper. The usual disclaimer applies.
EU environmental crime directive, as this could affect the ability of the EU member states to adopt and negotiate independently the Council of Europe environmental crime convention. The last section of this paper discusses the extent to which the legality of EU environmental crime legislation may be challenged for incompatibility with international environmental agreements.
THE ADOPTION OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME CONVENTION AND THE EU ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME DIRECTIVE In the early 1990s there were calls for a comprehensive treaty addressing the growing evidence of the costs and risks associated with environmental criminality. In the seventeenth Conference of European Ministers of Justice (Istanbul, 1990) Europe/CoE environmental crime convention'). 4 It was the first international treaty to require more broadly the criminalisation of a number of offences causing or likely to cause environmental damage.
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The Council of Europe environmental crime convention aims at criminalising environmental harm and harmonising environmental criminal offences and administrative infringements and penalties. The
Council of Europe's treaty for a harmonised system of environmental criminal law flows from the idea that criminal law is essential in order to strengthen the protection of the environment, whilst also recognising the effectiveness of other penalties, in particular administrative penalties. In this vein, the Convention aims to establish a minimum standard for a common criminal policy on the protection of the environment. At the time of writing, the Council of Europe Convention has not reached the minimum number of ratifications required for it to enter into force. It has only attracted one ratification by Estonia on 26 April 2002 and a total of fourteen signatures. 6 Since the convention requires three ratifications for it to enter into force, 7 it remains inoperative.
In the European Union setting, following a major constitutional challenge regarding the legal basis for the EU legislative initiatives to combat environmental crime, 8 in February 2007 Commission   3 The draft Convention and explanatory memorandum were approved by the European Committee on Crime Problems (CDPC) and adopted by the Committee of Ministers on June/September 1996. It is apparent that there will be insufficient political will by the European governments to boost the ratification process of the Council of Europe environmental crime convention. This is particularly so because the EU member states are themselves already bound by the EU standards under the environmental criminal law directive. So unless the political will across Europe increases for adoption of more effective measures to improve interstate cooperation against environmental crime, it is likely that the CoE environmental crime convention will face a similar fate to the Lugano Convention on civil liability for environmental damage, 20 which has not at time of writing attracted one single ratification by the Council of Europe member states, even after more than fifteen years since its adoption.
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On the other hand, the adoption of The next section examines the extent to which the adoption of the environmental crime directive could have implications for the external competence of the EU member states to negotiate and adopt the CoE environmental crime convention. In particular, it discusses the extent to which the adoption of the EU environmental crime directive in 2008 could hinder the ability of the EU member states to ratify independently the Council of Europe environmental crime convention.
THE EU EXTERNAL COMPETENCE TO NEGOTIATE AND ADOPT INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS
The adoption of the EU directive on environmental crimes will have important consequences for the member states' external competence to negotiate and eventually ratify the Council of Europe environmental crime convention. This might require the involvement of both the Union and the member states in the negotiations of the Council of Europe environmental crime convention. 30 However, it should be noted that the EC has not participated in the negotiations of the environmental crime convention, which only foresees the accession by states, but not regional organisations such as the EC/EU.
31
According to Article 3 (2) TFEU, the Union has exclusive competence for the conclusion of an international agreement 'insofar as its conclusion may affect common rules and their scope.' So in case the EU exercises its internal competence (for example, through the adoption of the environmental crime directive), this could lead to the exclusivity of the EU external competence. This manner of acquiring exclusive external competences was recognized for the first time by the ECJ in the ERTA case 32 and was further refined, inter alia, in the Open Skies cases. 33 Yet for the EU competence to be exclusive following the EU legislative action, the conclusion of an international agreement would have to 'affect common rules or alter their scope.' In order to establish that the conclusion of an international agreement affects common rules or alter their scope, the EU institutions might have to 'specify in detail the aspects of Community legislation which could be prejudiced by the agreement.'
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The EU exclusive competence would arise in general when the EU internal legislation involves Article 3 (c) of the environmental crime directive refers to Article 2 (35) of the Regulation on shipments of waste. This later provision defines illegal shipment as those shipments carried out under certain circumstances including a) without notification to all competent authorities concerned pursuant to this Regulation; or (b) without the consent of the competent authorities concerned pursuant to this Regulation. 49 Article 3 (h) of the environmental crime directive. See also Pereira (n 23) 50 The offences in environmental crime directive generally require the prohibited activity "to cause" or "[to be] likely to cause" damage or injury to a person or the environment. See Article 3 (a), (b), (d), (e). The offences against protected specimens (f-g) and protected habitat (h) also apply a specific damage threshold. Commentary III, Section II, of the explanatory memorandum states that Article 2 covers the most serious environmental offences which, whether by an act or an omission, are committed "intentionally". to adopt criminal or non-criminal sanctions. So the Contracting States to the convention are obliged, in relation to the "hard core" intentional offences under Articles 2, to classify them as "criminal." 58 Moreover, paragraph (1) of Article 3 extends criminal liability to negligent offences. Yet paragraph 2 of Article 3 allows contracting parties, when ratifying the Convention, to limit liability for Article 2 offences to those committed with 'gross negligence.' 59 Under the EU environmental crime directive, member states are required to criminalise a number of prohibited activities committed intentionally or with 'at least' serious negligence. 60 However, unlike the Council of Europe convention, the EU directive itself does not establish an aggravated liability depending on whether criminal offences are committed with intention, recklessness or negligence. This means that, to the extent that the Council of Europe convention aggravates the liability (in relation to 'intentional' offences), this would be the highest standard to be adopted by a EU member state bound by both environmental crime instruments. In contrast, the EU directive applies, in general, more stringent requirements in relation to offences committed with recklessness or serious negligence, and thus this would be the standard to be implemented. The Council of Europe convention refers to 'gross negligence', rather than 'serious negligence' applied in the EU environmental crime instruments. See Environmental Crimes (supra n. 8), paras. 47-48. to specific offences, there appears to be no conflict between the two instruments as regards the definition of the threshold of harm required for establishing a criminal offence.
(4) The range of criminal offences
The range of offences in the Council of Europe Convention on environmental crime is more comprehensive than under the environmental crime directive. In particular, the Council of Europe convention protects additional forms of environmental media, such as offering legal protection in relation to the unlawful causing of 'noise,' 64 specific legal protection to 'national parks, national reserve, water conservation or other protected areas,' 65 as well as to 'protected monuments' and 'other protected objects [and] property.' 66 Hence, unlike the EU environmental crime directive which aims to protect 'any person' and 'air', 'soil', 'water', 'animals' or 'plants,' 67 the Council of Europe
Convention additionally aims at protecting 'property' and other elements of the 'built environment', thus establishing a higher standard than the EU environmental crime directive.
Another difference relates to the definition of specific criminal offences. For example, the pollutioncontrol offences in the environmental crime directive borrow a number of elements from the pollutioncontrol offences under the Council of Europe convention on environmental crime. However, the Council of Europe convention requires the criminalisation only of concrete endangerment pollution-control offences (i.e. those that cause or are likely to cause damage) when committed intentionally or negligently, 68 but not generally in relation to abstract endangerment pollution-control offences (such as the 'unlawful operation of a plant'), which hence may be regarded as criminal or administrative offences by state parties. 69 In another example, the Council of Europe Convention does not address directly the trade in ozone depleting substances, although the offence on illegal trade in chemicals could cover illegal trade in ozone depleting substances. 70 In contrast, the EU environmental crime directive requires the criminalisation of 'the production, importation, exportation, placing on the market or use' of ozone depleting substances. 71 Therefore, in so far as the EU environmental crime directive requires the criminalisation of pollution-control (non-intentional) offences, or in relation to illegal trade in ozone depleting substances, it could be said that the directive imposes higher standards than those foreseen in the Council of Europe convention.
Aside from the level of harm (as discussed above), it is not always clear why the Council of Europe environmental crime convention "downgrades" certain offences to Article 4 (in relation to which there is no obligation for contracting States to penalise), particularly in the context of wildlife crime. This This limitation is in light of the Ship-Source Pollution ruling (Case 440/05) in which the ECJ held that the Community did not have the power to define specific types and levels of criminal penalties. However, it is possible that the EU environmental crime directive will be amended inter alia to require that member states adopt specific types and levels of criminal penalties based on the post-Lisbon legal basis established in Article 83 (2) TFEU. See further, Pereira, supra (n23). Conventions on the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes contain provisions requiring the use of penal measures, that is, a requirement that states take 'appropriate measures' to ensure the application of the agreement and punishment of violators thereof. 85 Community is a party -the ECJ held that the Community was bound by that Convention and that it formed an integral part of the Community legal order. 98 Yet the court held that the nature and broad logic of UNCLOS precluded the examination of the validity of the shipping directive in light of its provisions, as UNCLOS was not directly applicable in the EU legal order 99 as it does not aim to create rights for individuals or companies, such as shipping companies. 100 On this basis, the ECJ ultimately declared that it was not possible for the court to examine the compatibility of directive on shipping pollution with either MARPOL or UNCLOS.
The court was correct to hold that a provision of an international agreement must be unconditional and sufficiently precise (and must confer rights on individuals), before it can be regarded to be directly effective in the Community/Union legal order. Yet the court failed to consider the exceptions to that rule recognized in previous case-law, namely in cases in which the and the main objective of the shipping pollution directive appears to be to implement MARPOL, rather than UNCLOS, standards.
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The decision of the ECJ in Intertanko suggests that the court will be cautious to review the legality of EU secondary (environmental crime) legislation in light of multilateral environmental agreements, even in the case of international agreements to which the EC/EU are parties. The court's restrictive approach suggests that only exceptionally will the court recognise direct effect to international
agreements. This appears to bean attempt by the court to maintain the delicate balance between the the international and EU legal orders; and to preserve the EU's position in negotiating and adopting such international agreements. Yet the disadvantage of court's restrictive approach is that it considerably limits the access of individuals to an effective remedy before the national courts to challenge the legality of EU secondary legislation in light of international environmental agreements.
CONCLUSIONS
Although there are significant differences between the provisions of the Council of Europe convention and the EU environmental crime directive, it does not appear that the former 'affects common rules' or 'alter their scope' to a significant extent so as to make the two instruments incompatible. Indeed, both instruments share the common goal of providing a legal framework for interstate criminal-law cooperation to combat environmental crime and for harmonisation of national environmental law in Europe. So it is unlikely that the minimum standards adopted in each instrument could be regarded as incompatible. Whereas at times the Council of Europe adopts certain higher standards than the EU environmental crime directive (eg as regards the definition of criminal penalties), at other times the environmental crime directive imposes higher standards (eg by requiring the criminalisation of wildlife crime and trade in ozone-depleting substances). But the existence of these differences does not mean that those instruments are incompatible. If a EU Member State (eg Estonia) were to be bound by both the Council of Europe convention and the EU environmental crime directive, it would have to adopt as a minimum the highest standard recognized in either instrument. The survey carriedout in this paper of specific provisions of the directive and Council of Europe conventionon environmental crime does notsuggest that there are fundamental differences between the two instruments which could render them incompatible and thus affect or alter the scope of the common EU rules.
Therefore, it is suggested that the EU member states remain competent to negotiate and ratify independently the Council of Europe convention, despite the exercise of the EU's internal legislative powers through the adoption of the environmental crime directive. This conforms with the principle recognized by the Court of Justice of the EU that, in general, the adoption of EU directives imposing minimum standards only gives rise to non-exclusive EU external competences to negotiate and adopt international agreements. It is also notable that although the Council of Europe environmental crime
